


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DIRECTORATE OF
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WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Yugoslavia: The Passing of the Old Guard

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YUGOSLAVIA: THE PASSING OF THE OLD GUARD

The ninth party congress scheduled to open in Belgrade on 11 March will effect a major turnover in the Yugoslav leadership in accord with the current emphasis on placing qualified, well-educated younger people in policy-making positions—the climax of a concerted effort to replace Yugoslavia's professional revolutionaries with revolutionary professionals. At the recently concluded party congresses in the republics, many "old partisans" of doubtful competence were dropped from the party apparatus.

The congress probably will not designate a successor to Tito—he will be 77 in May—and Yugoslav politics will continue to be affected by this unknown, but it is not as important as it was only a few years ago. Tito, as a symbol, has been an important factor in keeping the various Yugoslav nationalities united, and there is no replacement for him in this capacity. Belgrade is engaged in a large-scale decentralization of authority to the republics, however, and it is hoped that this will afford the various nationalities an equal voice in Yugoslav affairs and make the absence of a strong central figure less important. Although decentralization appears to be the safest way of dealing with the succession problem, it has its hazards. New grants of power to the republics may whet their appetites and threaten the fragile unity of the federation.



TITO LEADS PARTISAN COLUMN

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THE TRANSFER OF POWER

The stage has been set to make the ninth party congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) the final act in a major transformation of the party leadership and organization that began with the ouster of Tito's heir apparent, Aleksandar Rankovic, in July 1966. The election results at the various republic party congresses held between November and January make it clear that younger and more liberal officials will replace most of the party's old guard functionaries.

The republic congresses took a major step forward by bringing into the federal and republic decision-making process people who will vigorously carry out Yugoslavia's economic, social, and party reforms. Sixty-nine percent of the newly elected republic central committees are freshmen members and one third of them made their reputations in work other than party activity. Thus, a significant transfusion of new blood and ideas into the primary policy organ of the republic party organizations has taken place.

The republic nominations to the national party organs, which the forthcoming Congress will formalize, makes this pattern complete. The most powerful LCY body, the presidium, is being expanded from 35 to over 50 members, but only 12 of the old members were renominated. The average age of the new presidium membership is about 45; the range is from 35 to 58. The individual members are predominantly liberal or at the very least supporters of the liberal-minded majority on all important issues.

The outgoing LCY hierarchy was elected at the last party congress in December 1964, when Rankovic was still in power, and it contains many conservatives who have only paid lip service to Tito's reform movement. Others, while not necessarily obstructive or incompetent, were little

*Those were the days,
my friend,
We thought they'd
never end*

*We'd sing and dance
forever and a day*

*We'd live the life
we choose
We'd fight and
never lose*

*For we were young
And sure to have our way*

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more than political hacks. Tito accomplished what may have been one of the most difficult tasks of his career in somehow convincing many of these men to step down. The student riots last June and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August gave a sense of urgency to Tito's campaign to revitalize the leadership and probably accounts for its success. A serious attempt can now be made to align the style and role of the party with the promotion of a self-management system.

An article in the 14 December issue of Borba, a major Belgrade daily, dramatizes the general acceptance of the transfer of power. The article, written by Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo, an outgoing member of the LCY presidium and an unreconstructed party mandarin of long tenure, defended the rejuvenation of party cadres and disclosed that "more than half of all party leaderships in Yugoslavia, from the base to the top, will be replaced." Vukmanovic noted that the replacement of old cadres will produce "certain shocks." He wrote, "It is the hardest test of every revolutionary to realize the time when he must yield his place to new and more capable cadres." He added, significantly, "If a revolutionary fails this test, then he might find himself in a conservative position, obstructing the very development of society he once fought for—and those who obstinately retain their leading positions might even be removed as counterrevolutionaries."

Many prominent party veterans took the hint and announced before the republic party congresses their firm intention to step aside for those "who have grown up in the self-management system." These "retirements" do not necessarily mean political death for these individuals, some of whom may be given important party work in various party commissions. Others, stripped of their party posts, may be assigned government positions in accord with Belgrade's policy of rotating state and party officials.


TITO: NOVEMBER 1968

"The older generation must, because of physiological and other processes, gradually give way to younger people...

the younger generation should more and more assume the leading position in the League of Communists."

--from a speech at Osijek, Croatia

JOSIP BROZ
TITO, 1968



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The peaceful transfer of political power at the ninth party congress to a younger generation will provide Yugoslavia with an important precedent to cope with future leadership crises. Indeed, it may even be taken as a sign that when the time comes, Yugoslavia will find a tranquil solution to its most critical leadership problem, the selection of Tito's successor.

THE SUCCESSION

The ninth party congress might be Tito's last, and the nation is concerned because no other leader can command the loyalty of all elements of this complex society so much at odds with itself.

Tito's death would be a serious loss under any circumstances, but it should not open a period of chaos as it might a few years ago. The trend toward decentralization of political and economic power in recent years has made this possibility less likely. Moreover, as the authority of the party's central administrative machinery decreases, there will be a simultaneous decrease in the need for strong central direction from the next party leader.

YUGOSLAVIAN ECONOMIC REFORM The Self-Management System

The self-management system reduces the central government's role in the economy by giving increased decision-making responsibility to local commercial enterprises. Freed from meeting centrally determined goals, enterprises have become profit-oriented and act on their own judgment of the "market." Enterprise managers, in turn, are subject to policies laid down by a workers' council elected by all enterprise employees. This independent spirit has also spilled over into party, government, and military affairs.

Tito has been criticized by some Yugoslavs for not grooming a successor, but his apparent neglect may be deliberate. Tito's charisma and special place in Yugoslav history make it impossible for anyone to assume a similar role. The most likely outcome—and the one that offers the best prospect for an orderly succession—is the emergence of a collective leadership that appoints one of its members first among equals.

This collective leadership is almost certain to come out of the party's presidium, which is empowered to elect the president of the LCY. The twelve holdover nominees to the new presidium will probably form an "inner circle," and there is a good chance that any new president of the LCY in the immediate future would be selected from among these men. As time passes, however, this group—with the exception of Edvard Kardelj and Krste Crvenkovski—will probably lose its vantage ground to the newcomers.

Kardelj, 58, the oldest nominee to the new presidium, has been called the father of Yugoslavia's self-management policy and will continue to be a dominant influence in the new leadership. Crvenkovski, at 47, is one of the youngest party veterans and is an outspoken proponent of Yugoslavia's liberal reforms.

Some members of the "inner circle" would not be popular candidates to head the party because of their lukewarm support of the reform movement. Nationality and health—and in the case of Dabcevic-Kucar, her sex—would eliminate others from the frontrunner position. In any case, as long as the trend toward diversification of power and rotation of officials continues, whoever assumes Tito's mantle will not have his power.

REPUBLIC AUTONOMY

The process of decentralization of federal organs and prerogatives has gained momentum in

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recent months. The State Security Services' command and control, for example, is now a concern of both the federation and the republics. Economic reform measures continue to shift financial means, as well as much of the decision-making power in economic matters, from the federation to republics, provinces, communes, and enterprises. The republics have even been given a role in the formulation of foreign policy.

The recently concluded local party congresses provide evidence of the increased independence of the republics. In the past, these congresses followed after and simply rubber-stamped the decisions of the all-Yugoslav party congress. Delegates to the ninth party congress will reverse this tradition when they arrive in Belgrade with an obligation to promote the decisions taken at their local congresses. In addition, the republics for the first time adopted their own party statutes, which are supposed to reflect their own peculiarities. The republics also retained their central committees and abolished their presidiums in direct contradiction to the party structural changes proposed by the LCY last July.

Greater responsibility for national defense also has been transmitted to local authorities under a law passed by Yugoslavia's National Assembly in February. This authorizes local and regional levels to organize and initiate armed resistance. The plan provides for the establishment of territorial defense, civil defense, and work units—using most of the civilian population—to supplement the regular armed forces. In effect, the republics would be setting up the nucleus of their own permanent standing forces.

In another step toward decentralization the Yugoslav National Assembly in late December approved a revision of the constitution, the second in two years, which will considerably strengthen the prerogatives of Yugoslavia's republics and provinces by increasing the power of the

POSSIBLE SUCCESSORS TO TITO

Kardelj will have to overcome his reputation as a theoretician, as a formulator rather than an executor of policy, before he would be selected as Tito's replacement.

Crvenkovski has been the leader of the Macedonian party since 1963, and his nationality might make him a compromise candidate to succeed Tito in the midst of a traditional Serbo-Croatian rivalry. Yugoslavia's feud with Bulgaria over Macedonia, if it continues its bitter course, might also redound to his advantage.



KARDELJ



CRVENKOVSKI

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RESULTS OF THE YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES

All republic party presidiums were abolished. There were 297 members elected to central committees.

Elected For First Time	205	(69 %)	Age Grouping			
From Economic Enterprises	90	(30 %)	Under 25	10 (3.4%)	31-40	136 (45.8%)
Women	37	(12.5%)	26-30	34 (11.4%)	41-50	109 (36.7%)
			Over 51	8 (2.7%)		

CENTRAL COMMITTEES MEMBERSHIP				REPUBLIC PARTY LEADERS†		REPUBLIC NOMINEES TO LCY PRESIDUM
	Reduced From	To	Hold overs	President	Secretary	
MACEDONIA 18-21 Nov. 1968	87	52	17	Krste Crvenkovski*	Angel Cemerski	Dimce Belovski Kiro Gligorov Lazar Kolisevski* Slavko Milosavlevski Azem Zulficari
SERBIA 21-23 Nov 1968	136	55	15	Marko Nikezic	Latinka Perovic	Krsta Avramovic Miroslav Pecujlic Milentije Popovic* Petar Stambolic* Mijalko Todorovic
CROATIA 5-7 Dec 1968	113	65	27	Vladimir Bakaric*	Mika Tripalo*	Jakov Blazevic* Srecko Bijelic Savka Dabcevic-Kucar* Pavle Gazi Zvonko Liker
SLOVENIA 9-11 Dec 1968	99	41	10	Franc Popit	Adrej Marinc	Edvard Kardelj* Stane Kavic Sergej Krajger Stane Kranc Mitja Ribicic
MONTENEGRO 12-14 Dec 1968	71	35	9	Veselin Djuranovic	Dobroslav Culafic	Emin Dobardzic Budislav Soskic Milorad Stanojevic Velko Vlahovic* Vidoje Zarkovic
BOSNIA 9-11 Jan 1969	103	45	10	Cvijetin Mijatovic*	Nijaz Dizdarevic	Rato Dugonjic* Branko Kikulic Hamdija Pozderac Bosko Siljegovic Stanko Tomic
Autonomous Provinces KOSOVO	Unknown			Veli Deva	Kadri Reufi	Fadil Hodza* Jovan Pecenovica Kolj Sorika
VOJVODINA Unknown	Unknown			Mirko Tepevac	Mirko Canaganovic	Stevan Doronjski Jozef Nadj Mirko Tepevac
Army	-			-	Branko Borojevic	Branko Borojevic Ivan Dolnicar Nikola Ljubicic

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†Ex-officio members LCY Presidium

*Incumbents

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Chamber of Nationalities. Proposals originating in other federal legislative bodies must now receive approval from the Chamber of Nationalities before they are enacted. Moreover, two of the federal chambers have been abolished, and delegates to a newly created sociopolitical chamber will be elected directly and proportionally to the population of a commune whose particular interests they will represent.

The trend toward more republic autonomy probably will be accelerated by the new leadership. Newly elected Slovenian party secretary Andrej Marinc recently observed that the overriding postwar needs for unity and highly centralized authority no longer exist, and that it is now both possible and desirable that the primary locus of party responsibility and authority be that of the republic parties.

PARTY ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP

The new party statutes, which will receive their final approval at the ninth party congress, provide for major changes in party organization. The principal aim of the reorganization is to streamline the party's leading organs to allow for a more rapid, flexible, and effective party response to major issues and the implementation of party policies.

The party congress will continue as the highest party organ and will meet every five, rather than four, years to establish the general political line. A new body, the conference, will be created to act as the highest party forum between congresses. The conference, which will consist of approximately 300 delegates, is intended to make basic policy decisions and will meet at least once a year. Most of the delegates to the conference will be elected annually by communal party conferences, but one quarter of them will be permanent delegates throughout the entire period between congresses.

The central committee of the LCY, and presumably its executive committee, will be abolished. Their role as the leading day-to-day party organ will be assumed by the presidium, which will be responsible for implementing current policy within the framework of the directions of the congress and conference. The presidium can be convened by the president, members of the presidium, or upon the request of one republic central committee.

With the rejuvenation of the party leadership, there has been an influx of fresh blood in the party rank and file. According to a December issue of the Yugoslav official party journal, Komunist, over 100,000 new members joined in 1968, more than twice the number of annual newcomers admitted in recent times. It is estimated that 75 percent of the newcomers are under 25. Total party membership increased by only 11,000 between 1961-66 and this stagnation was accompanied by a consistent decrease in the percentage of younger members.

Although the natural drive of every organization to perpetuate itself accounts for part of the current membership drive, there are other factors as well. New members were needed to compensate for the losses caused by the gradual but significant "silent purge" that followed Rankovic's ouster in 1966, and there was a need to maintain the tradition of increasing the party membership at each party congress. The crisis in Czechoslovakia provided still another reason and contributed to the success of the recruitment program. Faced with external threats, the party appealed for support and the population responded with patriotic fervor. Finally, the leadership decided that one way to deal with dissenting youth is to incorporate them into the body politic.

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NEW LEADERSHIP-OLD PROBLEMS

The most serious internal problems facing the new leadership are the familiar ones of nationality conflicts and restless youth. Although the regime attempted to minimize them, there were student disorders in Belgrade last June and three Albanian minority demonstrations in Kosovo and Macedonia in the last quarter of 1968.

Yugoslavia's underdeveloped republics and provinces are fertile soil for nationalist dissenters, and the party congress probably will recommend that the LCY take a firmer position on the economic integration of these areas. The first major hurdle of the new LCY leadership will be to convince the wealthier—but equally nationalist—republics that their destiny is linked to the well-being of their poorer neighbors.

Tensions may be lessened by a recent revision of the constitution that provides a parliamentary structure for settling intersectional rivalries and disputes. The party, however, will have to solve the underlying political, economic, and social causes of the nationality problem, and this will put a severe strain on its discipline and unity.

Yugoslavia's youth consider most of the older generation of political leaders narrow-minded, doctrinaire, and hostile to new ideas. They believe that the country has paid its debt to its partisan heroes, whose numbers seem to grow as the years go on, and that they should be retired

MARKO
NIKEZIC



DIMCE
BELOVSKI



KIRO
GLIGOROV



RIISING LIGHTS IN THE PARTY

Out of the mainstream of party life for some time, their sudden promotion to the presidium is probably designed to give these men the necessary profile to build a following within the party apparatus.

Nikezic and Belovski have been numbers one and two in the Foreign Ministry, and are well known as pragmatic, liberal-minded officials who will continue the reform policies. Nikezic, whose mother is French, is Western oriented and finished a four-year tour as ambassador to the US in 1962.

Gligorov, currently deputy premier, is a former federal secretary of finance who is considered by many as the architect of the Yugoslavia's economic reform.

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to make way for political progressives who have demonstrated professional ability. A topical joke among the youth tells how six men from a village joined the partisans during World War II; four were killed and after the war eight returned.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia last August distracted Yugoslavia's dissatisfied youth, at least temporarily, as nearly all Yugoslavs united around Tito and the party in the face of the potential threat from Moscow. The record number of young people that joined the party during this period has helped split the youth movement. Those who joined the party have found themselves neutralized and at the same time alienated from those who refused to join. The decentralization of Yugoslavia's youth organizations has also contributed to the fragmentation of the youth movement. As a result, the kind of street action that erupted at Belgrade University last June is not likely to recur soon.

For the present at least, Yugoslavia's younger generation is optimistic that the ninth party congress will produce a revitalized party leadership to lead the country forward. This era of good feeling could be short-lived if nothing is done to meet the student demands, particularly in the areas of employment opportunity and university reform.

OUTLOOK

The ninth party congress, which could be Tito's last hurrah, will take a major step forward

in achieving his long-set goals. The party organization will be streamlined and equipped with a vigorous new leadership dedicated to establishing an efficient socialist market economy with the broadest possible measure of social equality and national unity. Direct participation of workers in the management of their own enterprises will be more firmly established within the framework and under the guidance of a dynamic Communist Party.

The potential threat from Moscow, following the invasion of Czechoslovakia, has produced a degree of unity among Yugoslavia's various nationalists and has underscored the stake they have in each others' welfare. Nevertheless, the explosive nationality question will continue to provide a problem of internal stability and the issue will be the new regime's most serious challenge. The immediate danger of student unrest seems to have passed. Improved employment opportunities and university reform measures would further deflate the student movement, which is already fragmenting.

To deal with the succession problem, Tito and his new leadership are prepared to gamble that decentralization will not enflame the separatist tendencies that now smolder in some Yugoslav republics. The new leadership that comes out of the ninth party congress is talented enough to have a major impact on the control of these events, and it is pragmatic enough to recognize that its best interests lie in a unified Yugoslavia.

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